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Abstract Many drugs have therapeutic off-label uses
for which they were not originally designed. Some
drugs designed to treat neuropsychiatric and other
disorders may enhance certain normal cognitive and
affective functions. Because the long-term effects of
cognitive and affective enhancement are not known
and may be harmful, a precautionary principle
limiting its use seems warranted. As an expression
of autonomy, though, competent individuals should
be permitted to take cognition- and mood-enhancing
agents. But they need to be aware of the risks in
chronic use of these agents and to take responsibility
for their effects. A reasonable middle ground between
these positions is to warn those who choose to
enhance that doing so entails risks.
Keywords Authenticity . Anxiety . Attention .
Memory .Methylphenidate . Modafinil . Propranolol
Introduction
Many drugs have therapeutic off-label uses for which
they were not originally intended. These uses were
not part of the approval of the drugs and are not
included in their labelling. Some drugs designed to
treat neuropsychiatric disorders can enhance certain
normal cognitive functions. Methylphenidate (Ritalin)
can help people with ADHD to focus attention and
carry out cognitive tasks. This same drug might also
help university students and others who do not have
this disorder to increase their concentration and
perform better on exams or in their work. Modafinil
(Provigil) has been prescribed for narcolepsy, sleep
apnea, and shift-work sleep disorder. Now it is used to
promote alertness in people with regular sleep–wake
cycles. Other drugs are being designed to enhance the
consolidation, storage, and retrieval of memory for
people without any memory impairment. SSRIs
(selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) such as
fluoxetine (Prozac) are prescribed for the treatment
of depression and anxiety disorders. Yet some who
have not been diagnosed with these disorders take
these drugs to enhance their mood and feel “better
than well” [10, 17].
Some philosophers and bioethicists are concerned
that the use of these and other drugs to enhance
normal cognition and mood would result in a state of
inauthenticity [10, 24]. The drugs would create states
of mind that would in some sense be alien to people
taking them. I will show that this concern about
authenticity is unfounded. Then I will discuss what I
believe are more ethically significant questions about
the safety of enhancement drugs and consider the
potential benefits and risks of using them for this
purpose. In addition, I will argue that universal access
to cognition-enhancing agents would not help to
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to these drugs would not necessarily be unfair to those
who could not afford them. I will consider some of
the possible consequences of employers encouraging
employees to use these drugs in order to enhance
productivity. Finally, I will address the question of
whether cognitive enhancement would fundamentally
alter the doctor–patient relationship. Because the
long-term effects of cognitive and affective enhance-
ment are not known and could be harmful, a
precautionary principle may be warranted. Safety
concerns seem to justify limiting its use. As an
expression of autonomy, though, competent individ-
uals should be permitted to take enhancing agents.
But they need to be aware of the risks in chronic use
of these agents and to take responsibility for their
effects. A reasonable middle ground between these
positions is to warn those who choose to enhance that
doing so entails risks.
Alienation? Inauthenticity?
One concern about enhancing normal cognitive
capacities with drugs is that it would result in
alienation from our true selves. Our selves consist
partly in a unified set of psychological properties that
are generated and sustained by normally functioning
processes in the brain and central nervous system. We
come to have authentic selves by identifying with our
mental states. The state of identification results from a
process of critical reflection on our desires, beliefs,
intentions and other states of mind. It is through this
reflection that we reinforce or reject them as the
springs of our actions. Having an authentic self
consists in having the higher-order reflective capacity
to control which motivational states issue in our
actions [14, 15, 23]. This capacity is a necessary
condition for authentic and responsible agency, and
insofar as agency is an essential component of
selfhood, being an authentic agent is part of being
an authentic self. Altering the process of critical
reflection and the motivational states that result from
it with psychotropic drugs presumably would result in
alienation of our true selves from these states. We
could not identify with these altered states and could
not have authentic selves because something alien to
us would be the agent of the change.
But it is not obvious that any drugs used to
enhance cognition or mood would make our selves
inauthentic. If an individual with the capacity for
practical reasoning freely decides to take a cognition-
or mood-enhancing agent, then he or she is the agent
of change. The drug is merely the means through
which the change in mental states is effected.
Provided that the individual has the capacity to
critically reflect on the reasons for and against
enhancement and to voluntarily act on these reasons,
the change in mental states would not necessarily
result in an alien or inauthentic self. The individual
would have the capacity to foresee the change in
mental states, and insofar as this is what he or she
desires, intends, and decides to do after critical
reflection, the change would be of his or her own
doing. The realization of the intention to alter some of
one’s mental states would not necessarily alter
numerical identity. Despite the changes, one could
remain the same person after taking the drug, though
it would depend on how substantial the changes were.
The alteration could also be consistent with one’s
narrative identity. It could be an essential part of the
unified set of values and interests over the course of
one’s entire biographical life. [8, 26].
Even if one claimed that any psychological
discontinuity between the earlier and later mental
states would be substantial enough to result in distinct
selves, the capacity to foresee the consequences of
enhancement would be enough to make one respon-
sible for them. Consider Stevenson’s tale of Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde. Jekyll transforms himself into the evil
Hyde by voluntarily taking a potion. Later, when his
curiosity moves him to repeat the experiment, he
finds himself the subject of the involuntary mental
states that characterize Hyde. Although it is Hyde
who commits the evil deeds, Jekyll is responsible for
them because he has the capacity to know that they
are the likely consequences of his experiment and to
prevent them by not taking the potion in the first
place. Foreseeability makes the responsibility transfer
from the earlier to the later time. This seems to be the
point of Jekyll’s admission, when speaking of Hyde,
that “this too was myself” ([30], 133).
Attention and Alertness
Methylphenidate is a central nervous system stimulant
and dopamine reuptake inhibitor. When used as a
form of enhancement, it can increase attention in
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people whose dopamine levels are normal. Yet in
brains with normal levels of dopamine, methylpheni-
date may cause dopamine dysregulation in various
neural networks and lead to cognitive and conative
abnormalities such as addiction. This has occurred,
for example, in some patients taking dopamine
agonists for Parkinson’s disease [9]. The drugs
overcompensated for the dopamine depletion in the
basal ganglia and other regions implicated in the
disease.
Experiments using modafinil have shown that it
can keep people alert and engaged in mental activities
despite long periods of sleep deprivation [32, 33]. It is
believed that this drug activates dopamine, which then
activates norepinephrine and histamine in a process
that blocks the hypothalamus from promoting sleep.
Modafinil does not appear to produce the same
hyperactive and addictive effects of stimulants like
amphetamines and cocaine because of its selectivity
in targeting the dopamine pathway that controls
wakefulness.
If the use of modafinil resulted in long-term REM
sleep deprivation, however, then it could have
deleterious effects on the brain and body [27, 28].
Constant release of monoamines such as serotonin to
sustain prolonged awareness of the environment may
desensitize neurotransmitter receptors. REM sleep
appears to inhibit monoamine release and allow the
receptors to rest and reset themselves and retain
sensitivity. Disturbing this process may have adverse
effects of cognition and mood. In addition, non-rapid-
eye-movement (NREM) sleep provides a period of
low metabolic demand in the brain, which allows
neuronal energy resources to be replenished. This is
necessary for the brain to meet high metabolic
demand during wakefulness. Drugs such as modafinil
that limited NREM sleep could disrupt brain metab-
olism and interfere with the brain’s ability to support
cognitive tasks. Sleep also plays an important role in
maintaining neural plasticity. Limiting sleep through
pharmacological means could impair the brain’s
ability to adapt to changing environments or to adjust
to injury. People who are chronically sleep-deprived
(4 h or less per night) generally are at greater risk of
morbidity and mortality than those who sleep 6 to 8 h
per night. The shorter sleepers have a higher
incidence of cardiovascular problems such as hyper-
tension and neurological problems such as stroke and
are more susceptible to infection because of weakened
immune systems. Sleep deprivation may also be a risk
factor for metabolic and endocrine disorders such as
obesity and diabetes. Chronic use of a drug like
modafinil might cause or exacerbate these conditions.
There are established contraindications for mod-
afinil. It should be used with caution in patients with a
history of psychosis or cardiovascular disease. Its side
effects are similar to those of other stimulants. More
precisely, some individuals taking this drug experi-
ence confusion, ataxia, hyperglycemia, paresthesia,
dyspnea, and other symptoms [29]. In principle, a
competent individual should be permitted to take
modafinil to enhance alertness if he or she so desires.
But one’s prudential reasons for taking it should
include awareness of these contraindications and a
careful weighing of its potential benefits and risks.
Memory
Research into the mechanisms of memory suggests
that novel pharmacological agents could enhance the
encoding and storage of episodic and semantic
memory of events and facts. “Smart” drugs targeting
the transcription factor cyclic AMP response element
binding protein (CREB), which influences the encod-
ing and storage of long-term memory, might increase
memory capacity in our brains. [20, 31] This effect
might also be achieved through drugs that increased
levels of acetylcholine, the main neurotransmitter
involved in the regulation of memory. Other pharma-
cological agents that might have a similar effect are
ampakines, which can influence the neurotransmitter
glutamate and promote better communication be-
tween synapses in the cortex. These agents might
also enhance the retrieval of remembered facts and
events from the hippocampus and other sites in the
medial temporal lobes by the prefrontal cortex for
short-term working memory in executive cognitive
functions. Insofar as it would be used by people with
normal memory functions, enhancement would be
different from the therapeutic use of drugs such as the
cholinesterase inhibitor donepezil (Aricept) and the
glutamate antagonist memantine (Namenda) to retard
memory loss in Alzheimer disease. Memory enhance-
ment could result in more effective cognitive capac-
ities such as problem-solving and decision-making.
Would these drugs enable us to form and store more
memories and retrieve them more quickly? Or would
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increasing the storage capacity of memories impair
our capacity to retrieve them?
These questions are motivated by an evolutionary
interpretation of memory. The limits we have in our
normal capacity to remember only so many facts and
so many events may be part of an adaptive mecha-
nism that is critical to our survival. In that case,
attempting to increase the storage capacity in one
system could have adverse effects on formation or
retrieval in that same system. It could also have
adverse effects on formation, storage, and retrieval
mechanisms in other memory systems.
The idea that there is an adaptive limit to memory
formation and storage is based on the hypothesis that
there is a balance between two types of CREB in the
brain: “activator CREB; and “blocker” CREB [1].
The first type activates the genes and gene products
necessary for the encoding or formation of long-term
memory, while the second type inhibits the formation
of additional long-term memory. Blocker CREB may
also remove existing memories from storage sites in
the hippocampus and cortex if the brain deems them
to be unnecessary. It does this in order to prevent
mental “noise” that would interfere with our ability to
concentrate on immediate mental activities and to
anticipate the future. Too much blocker CREB could
result in forgetfulness and, in severe cases, dementia.
Too much activator CREB could result in an
overproduction and oversupply of memory, the brain
and mind being cluttered with memories of facts and
events that served no purpose. Drugs designed to
enhance memory would aim to increase the amount of
activator CREB. But if there is an adaptive balance
between the two types of CREB, and between
remembering and forgetting, then drugs that increased
memory storage could upset this balance. One
possible consequence of this might be impaired
memory retrieval. Neuroscientist Martha Farah
expresses this same concern: “We understand very
little about the design constraints that were being
satisfied in the process of creating a human brain.
Therefore we do not know which ‘limitations’ are
there for a good reason... Normal forgetting rates
seem to be optimal for information retrieval” ([11],
1125).
Another possible consequence of increased mem-
ory would be difficulty in learning new things, which
depends on a certain degree of forgetting. The most
famous case of this condition was the patient
Shereshevkii, as reported by the neuropsychologist
A. R. Luria [19]. Shereshevkii’s formidable ability to
remember facts and events resulted in his inability to
process new information. The only employment he
could sustain was that of a travelling mnemonist. A
fictional illustration of this condition is the character
Ireneo Funes in Jorge Luis Borges’ story “Funes the
Memorious” [2]. Funes sustains a brain injury from
an equestrian accident. Consistent with Borges’
penchant for irony, Funes does not develop amnesia
but instead a condition in which he remembers every
detail of everything he experiences. Speaking to the
narrator, Funes says, “My memory, sir, is like a
garbage disposal” (p. 32). He becomes an invalid, a
prisoner of a hyperactive system of memory consol-
idation and recall, unable to learn new things and
anticipate the future because he cannot tolerate any
additional experience. The narrator suspects that
Funes “was not very capable of thought. To think is
to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract. In the
overly replete world of Funes, there were nothing but
details, almost contiguous details” (p. 36). Because of
his overloaded memory, Funes is unable to execute
such cognitive tasks as problem-solving and decision-
making. He is also unable to anticipate and plan for
the future because he cannot forget the particular
features of his experience. Borges writes that Funes
died from “pulmonary congestion” (p. 36), which
could be taken as a metaphor for his overloaded
memory.
The problems of memory overload that I have
described could be avoided by separating retrieval of
recent memories from retrieval of remote memory. In
theory, drugs could be designed to avoid any adverse
effects by enhancing the storage and retrieval of
recent memory while allowing normal forgetting rates
of remote memory. Perhaps drugs targeting mecha-
nisms regulating working memory could have this
effect. But even recent memory can include many
trivial details that can clutter the mind. It is unclear
how specially designed drugs could weed out recent
memory of trivial facts from recent memory of useful
facts, or whether quicker retrieval would not have any
untoward effects on memory formation and storage.
There are other critical features of memory consisting
of more than mechanisms of encoding, storage, and
retrieval. It is unclear what effects drugs designed to
enhance these mechanisms might have on these other
features of our ability to recall the past. It is possible
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that the drugs might do more to impair than improve
the usefulness and value of memory.
A recent study by Hassabis et al. sheds some light
on the problem exemplified by Luria’s patient and
Borges’ fictional character. The Hassabis study
compared people with bilateral hippocampal amnesia
with people whose episodic memory was intact.
Whatever episodic memory the amnesiacs retained
consisted mainly in recalling trivial details of past
events. They were unable to express the general
meaning of these events and unable to imagine new
experiences. This supports the hypothesis that re-
membering the past and imagining the future are
interrelated mental capacities. Unlike the amnesiacs,
Shereshevkii and Funes had a preternatural capacity
for recall. Yet the fact that none of these individuals
was able to capture the gist of the past suggests that
what matters is not just how much one can recall, but
also how one recalls it. The ability to meaningfully
recall the past and anticipate the future appears to
depend as much on qualitative as on quantitative
aspects of our episodic memory. Hassabis’ study
suggests that increasing the quantity of memory
might interfere with the qualitative capacity to make
sense of past experience and simulate future experi-
ence. Among other things, this dual constructive
capacity enables us to have a unified set of psycho-
logical properties necessary for our experience of
ourselves as subjects persisting through time. While
this requires a certain amount of memory storage and
retrieval, it is more than a function of how many
memories of specific details our brains can store, or of
how efficiently our brains can retrieve them for
cognitive tasks.
As Daniel Schacter and Donna Rose Addis point
out, “remembering the gist of what happened is an
economical way of storing the most important aspects
of our experiences without cluttering memory with
trivial details” ([25], 27). They also note that
“information about the past is useful only to the
extent that it allows us to anticipate what may happen
in the future” ([25], 27). The extent to which we can
learn new things is a function of the meaning we can
construct from our past experience ([16], 1726).
Memory is not just a reproduction of past events.
The brain and mind do not function as a video
recorder, or as a bank from which we withdraw
particular memories of facts and events stored in
specific sites in the brain. In addition to the
hippocampus in the temporal lobe, regions in the
frontal and parietal lobes play a role in the dual
capacity to remember the past and anticipate the
future. The parietal lobe, which regulates our orien-
tation to space and time, is critical for this capacity.
Together with the hippocampus, it provides a holistic
representation of the environmental setting in which
we can meaningfully recall past experience and
simulate or imagine future experience. These brain
regions and the capacities they mediate are critical not
only to our experience of persisting through time.
They are also critical to the capacity of a human
organism to make sense of its interactions with the
social and natural environment.
Memory researcher James McGaugh insists that
we should be wary of inferring that if a certain
amount of memory is good, then more memory is
better [21, 22]. Our capacity to form and store more
memories might leave us too focused on the past,
which might alter our phenomenological experience
of persisting from the past to the future. Our cognitive
capacities could be diminished by our ability to recall
more facts and events that had little or no meaning or
purpose for us. Before we pharmacologically tinker
with memory systems, we need to consider how this
might affect our neurological and mental capacities
that mediate the content and meaning of memory. We
should look to Luria’s patient Shereshevkii, Borges’
character Funes, and the individuals in Hassabis’
study with bilateral hippocampal amnesia as examples
of the consequences we would want to avoid.
Keeping One’s Cool
Anxiolytics are prescribed and taken for conditions
falling within generalized anxiety disorder (GAD).
These drugs include benzodiazepines such as diaze-
pam (Valium) and lorazepam (Ativan), which block
the release of stress hormones such as adrenaline. Yet
these drugs are now being used by people who do not
have GAD in order to remain calm when they have to
act or interact with others in public. The beta-
adrenergic antagonist propranolol (Inderal) is primar-
ily an antihypertensive and antiarrhythmic drug
designed to reduce the cardiovascular excitatory
response to adrenaline and norepinephrine. By reduc-
ing this response in the brain as well, propranolol can
attenuate or prevent anxiety. Some musicians and
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public speakers may take propranolol to block the
stress response and thereby enhance their musical or
oratorical performance in recitals, concerts, and
lectures.
One musician taking propranolol told me that,
while his performances seemed to improve, the lack
of an “adrenaline rush” blunted the normal experien-
tial “feel” of these performances for him. He also
noted that he had only a vague memory of some of
his performances. This can be explained by the role of
stress hormones in memory consolidation. Adrenaline
and norepinephrine are necessary for the encoding
and consolidation of emotional memories in the
amygdala. They also may be necessary for the
encoding and consolidation of episodic memories in
the hippocampus. This might explain why some
people taking benzodiazepines experience some de-
gree of anterograde amnesia, or impairment in their
ability to form new memories. An anti-anxiety drug
may enable one to keep one’s cool during a
performance, only to block the memory of that
performance. Moreover, it is not known what effects
the continued use of a drug that blocked a natural
hormonal response might have on systems other than
the cardiovascular and central nervous systems.
Blocking natural hormonal responses to our inter-
actions with others in the social environment might
also interfere with our emotional responses to these
interactions. Any benefits of these drugs in enhancing
cognitive capacities may come at the cost of becom-
ing disengaged from one’s emotions. It is also
possible that, given the connection between cognition
and emotion, a pharmacological agent overactivating
the first faculty and underactivating the second could
impair reasoning and decision-making [6, 7]. This
would depend on the extent to which a beta-
adrenergic antagonist such as propranolol affected
cognition ([18], 193). The constellation of psycho-
logical properties resulting from cognitive enhance-
ment might not be so desirable in every case.
Suppose that a 10-year-old female is a piano
prodigy. Her parents and teachers believe that she is
destined for greatness in the musical world. But she
becomes anxious before her public performances. To
prevent anxiety, her parents give her propranolol,
which calms her and ensures a flawless musical
performance in every instance. Encouraged by her
parents, the child identifies with her musical prowess
and desires to be a world-class musician. It appears
that the child’s ability to perform at the highest level
will be an essential component of her well-being over
the course of her life. Would there by anything
objectionable about using propranolol in this case?
The fact that the pianist is not a mature minor or
adult and does not have the decisional capacity to
carefully think through the benefits and risks of
chronic use of propranolol is significant. She, not
her parents, would experience any long-term adverse
effects of the drug. Because she does not have
decisional capacity, and because the drug may involve
some risk to her health, one could object to the
parents’ decision to allow her to take propranolol. It is
not obvious that chronic use of this drug would be in
her long-term best interests. This is a decision she
could make on her own once she is competent enough
to weigh the benefits and risks of the drug. The
objection to permitting her parents to make decisions
about propranolol for her can be sustained despite the
fact that the drug appears to enhance her musical
development, and that discontinuing the drug may
foreclose future opportunities for her. It is possible
that, by the time she is mature enough to make critical
decisions, she may no longer identify with the desire
to be world-class musician. Even if the possibility of
being a great musician were lost, she might be able to
accommodate her interests to different possibilities or
develop new interests. By insisting that their daughter
take propranolol, the parents may be interfering with
her right to an open future, which will only begin to
take shape once she is capable of making her own
decisions [13]. Only in cases where anxiety signifi-
cantly limits a child’s ability to function in everyday
life would parental consent to the child’s use of
propranolol or any anxiolytic be justified. In these
cases, anxiolyics would be justified for therapeutic
uses, but not for enhancement.
Some mature adolescents or adults may take an
SSRI instead of an anxiolytic for a similar purpose.
Shyness may underlie their anxiety, and they may
believe that an antidepressant may enable them to
overcome this condition and become more successful
in all of their projects. There are questions about just
how effective these agents are for this purpose. Farah
has noted that “the small literature on short-term SSRI
effects in normal subjects suggests no change in either
direction on positive affect, only a selective decrease
in negative affect” ([11], 1125). However, there are
potentially serious side effects of SSRIs in people
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with normal levels of serotonin, norepinephrine, and
dopamine. Because antidepressants can increase the
availability of these neurotransmitters, they may result
in hypomania or mania in some biologically vulner-
able people. Hypomania can be confused with a
cheerful disposition, and taking drugs to enhance
mood could unwittingly cause this mental disorder. In
addition, these drugs may trigger the serotonin
syndrome, which is usually caused by a combination
of two or more drugs, one of which is an SSRI. It is a
consequence of excess serotonin in the central
nervous system. The syndrome’s symptoms can
include euphoria, drowsiness, exaggerated reflexes,
hyperthermia, and in some cases, coma and death.
The serotonin syndrome occurs in approximately 14
to 16% of persons who overdose on SSRIs [3]. In a
well-known case in a New York Hospital in 1984, a
combination of meperidene (Demerol) and phenelzine
(Nardil) resulted in this syndrome and the death of
18-year-old Libby Zion.
It is not known what the long-term cognitive,
affective, or conative effects of drugs to enhance
alertness, memory, or public performance might be.
What is known is that most drugs have side effects.
Admittedly, this concern is not unique to enhance-
ment drugs but applies to therapeutic drugs as well.
Still, it is one thing to administer a drug with potential
adverse effects for therapeutic treatment of a mental
disorder. It is quite another thing to administer a drug
with potential adverse effects to enhance normal
mental functions. This raises the question of why
one would take the risk of experiencing adverse
effects of a drug if there is no medical need for it.
Until there is a better understanding of the risks of
drugs intended for cognitive enhancement, the poten-
tial harm from long-term use of these drugs suggests
that they should be limited to short-term use in special
circumstances and only when there is a compelling
reason to use them. Yet because the long-term effects
of enhancement are not yet known, it would be
difficult to advocate for a policy that prohibited their
use for this purpose. It should be up to individuals to
choose whether to take cognition- or mood-enhancing
drugs, provided that they are warned of the risks.
Some may question the selective concern about the
drugs I have discussed. Many people take certain
foods or supplements to improve cognitive and
affective states of mind. Why is there such concern
about drugs when food and supplements are taken to
produce the same effects? Others may question why
some drugs but not others concern us. Why do we
not worry as much about the effects of nicotine or
alcohol as we do about the effects of modafinil,
CREB enhancers, anxiolytics, or SSRIs to enhance
cognition or mood?
The effects of psychotropic drugs on the brain and
central nervous system are more immediate and
profound than the effects of foods and supplements.
The fact that a comparatively lower dose of an SSRI
has a much greater effect on brain biochemistry and
mood than higher doses of St. John’s wort or
tryptophan indicates a significant difference in their
effects on the brain. Similarly, modafinil and other
stimulants such as dextroamphetamine have more
pronounced effects on brain biochemistry and alert-
ness than caffeine. The difference between pharma-
cological agents and foods or supplements in their
effects on the brain and central nervous system may
be one of degree rather than kind. But the difference
of degree is significant, which gives us a reason to be
concerned about the chronic use of these agents.
Regarding the second question, we should indeed be
just as concerned about nicotine and alcohol as we are
about psychotropic drugs. The adverse effects of
nicotine and alcohol on the brain and body are just
as harmful to individuals as the adverse effects of
psychotropic drugs. Accordingly, all of these sub-
stances should be discussed in the same context of the
risks to those who use them.
Social Issues
Attention, memory, and other cognitive capacities are
all components of intelligence, which is a competitive
good. It can give some people a competitive advan-
tage over others in gaining employment, income,
wealth, and a higher level of well-being. This
advantage, and the social inequality that results from
it, might be perceived as unfair because intelligence is
a set of capacities that one has or lacks through no
merit or fault of one’s own.
Some have argued that the best way to ameliorate
this situation would be to offer cognitive enhance-
ment drugs to all. Ideally, it would give everyone an
equal opportunity for access to the type of education
and employment that would guarantee a moderate to
high level of well-being for everyone. Farah has cited
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research indicating that any positive effects of
enhancement drugs are more modest in people with
higher levels of cognitive function and greater in
people with lower levels of cognitive function [11,
12]. This might suggest that cognition-enhancing
drugs could do much to reduce inequality in intelli-
gence and access to other competitive goods. But this
would not necessarily follow. Equal access to these
drugs would not imply equal opportunity or equal
outcomes from using them.
Different parental attitudes to related competitive
goods such as an elite education and lucrative jobs
could mean substantial differences among children in
the extent to which enhancing agents were utilized.
Some parents would be more selective than others in
sending their children to better schools or in arranging
for private tutors. In these respects, equal access to
cognitive enhancement would not automatically result
in equal opportunity for academic achievement
among children. Moreover, some adolescents and
adults would use cognition-enhancing drugs for trivial
activities. Instead of using methylphenidate to en-
hance alertness or other drugs to enhance memory in
order to perform better on the SAT or university
exams, some people would use these drugs to
memorize phone numbers or sports statistics. Or they
might use them for pathological pursuits such as
gambling. Not everyone would use these drugs in a
beneficial way. So there would be unequal outcomes
of cognitive enhancement with respect to the com-
petitive goods at issue. Any beneficial options of
enhancement would likely come on top of existing
social inequality. It would more likely maintain or
increase than reduce inequality in whether or to what
extent people gained competitive goods.
Universal access to drugs intended to enhance
cognition is not a likely scenario. States would be
reluctant to take on what would be an exorbitant cost.
Access to these expensive drugs would be based
instead on the ability to pay for them. Because some
people are financially worse off than others through
no fault of their own, this would seem unfair to those
who could not afford to pay for the drugs. They
would not have the same access to the drugs as those
who were financially better off. But any claim of
unfairness would have to be supported by a signifi-
cant body of data on the long-term benefits and risks
of the drugs. The relevant data are not currently
available. If the benefits and risks of these agents
were not known, then there would be no basis on
which to claim that unequal access to the drugs would
be unfair to those who could not afford them. The
claim about unfair access rests on the questionable
assumption that the drugs would have only beneficial
outcomes. Yet it is possible that those who used the
drugs over time might experience more harmful than
beneficial effects. They could end up being worse off
in terms of their physical and mental health than those
who could not purchase the drugs. Inequality in
access to cognition-enhancing drugs between the
financially better off and worse off would not
necessarily be unfair to the latter.
Employers might pressure employees to use
cognition-enhancing agents such as modafinil or
methylphenidate to execute cognitive tasks over a
longer period and thereby increase productivity. Some
employees might decline to use them, either because
of concern about their safety or a more general
concern about deleterious effects of longer hours
and increased productivity on their health. If the drugs
were effective, then those who declined to use them
could be at a competitive disadvantage compared with
their colleagues who used them [5, 12]. This could
jeopardize their jobs. Yet this assumes that the drugs
would have only salutary effects on the brain and
body. This may be true for short-term use; but it
cannot be assumed that longer-term use would have
only salutary effects. If chronic use of the drugs
resulted in adverse effects, then it is not clear that the
employees who used them, or the employer who
encouraged their use, would be any better off.
Adverse effects of the drugs could result in disability
claims by employees, which would result in negative
financial and legal consequences for the employer.
There is another reason for questioning claims
about fairness in access to cognition-enhancing drugs.
Leaving safety issues aside, it is not clear that these
drugs would have the same beneficial effects for
everyone who took them. Given differences in
people’s brains and their varying responses to
psychotropic drugs, it is possible that some people
would derive only a modest benefit from taking them,
or no benefit at all. One cannot assume that just
because these drugs may have positive effects on the
brains of some people, they would have positive
effects on the brains of all people.
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Implications for the Doctor–Patient Relationship
Suppose that cognition- and mood-enhancing drugs
were proven to be safe as well as effective. But they
would not be available over the counter or the
Internet. Suppose further that a person wanted a drug
to enhance his or her cognitive functions or mood and
asked a doctor to prescribe it for him or her.
Assuming that the drug was safe, there would be no
risk of harm to the individual, and the doctor would
be permitted to prescribe it. But there would be no
therapeutic relationship between doctor and patient,
given that the individual in such a case would not
have a disease or illness in any sense of these terms.
Even if we construe “therapy” loosely, it is unclear
how an intervention that did not restore a patient to,
or maintain a patient at, a normal level of mental and
physical functioning could be described as therapeu-
tic. The relationship in the case imagined here would
not be therapeutic, since there would be no condition
justifying medical intervention for treatment or
prevention. Thus the doctor would have no duty of
beneficence and no obligation to prescribe the drug
simply because the individual wanted it.
Modafinil may be prescribed as an alternative to
methylphenidate for the treatment of ADHD. Given
that ADHD is a psychiatric disorder, this use of the
drug would clearly be therapeutic. There may also be
compelling reasons for prescribing modafinil for
people who need it to perform specific occupational
tasks. Airline pilots on transcontinental flights and
night-shift workers would fall within this group.
Whether the use of a drug is described as a form of
therapy or enhancement depends not on the drug itself
but the purpose of its use. Doctors are obligated to
treat neurological, psychiatric, and other diseases and
thereby alleviate pain and suffering in patients who
have these diseases. This often involves prescribing
certain medications. In cases like the two just
mentioned, doctors may prescribe medications neces-
sary for certain types of work. But they are not
obligated to make people more competitive or happy.
Some have speculated that the possibility of
neurocognitive enhancement could fundamentally
alter the doctor–patient relationship [4, 5, 12].
Whether it does this will depend on physicians’ views
on what it means to have a therapeutic relationship
with patients, whether this is a fiduciary relationship,
and what it means to act in patients’ best interests. It
will depend on how physicians conceive of and
exercise their professional autonomy in discharging
their duty of care to patients. There may be
considerable variation among physicians in how they
exercise this autonomy, which would reflect their
views on which psychopharmacological interventions
they considered to be therapy, and which they
considered to be enhancement.
Conclusion
The human nervous system is much more complex
and sensitive to stimuli than any other system in the
human body. For this reason, and because the brain
regulates our thought and behaviour, the potential
harm from chronic pharmacological intervention in
the brain must be taken seriously. The plasticity of the
brain and the neurological and psychological effects
from manipulating it also distinguish cognitive and
mood enhancement from other forms of bodily
enhancement, such as cosmetic surgery. If chronic
use of psychotropic drugs to enhance mental func-
tions entailed only minimal benefit and a significant
risk of harm, and they were not medically indicated to
treat a disease, then there would be no good medical
or ethical reasons for doctors to prescribe them to
patients. Indeed, they might be prohibited from doing
this on grounds of nonmaleficence. Even if drugs that
enhanced cognition and mood were effective and safe,
doctors would not be obligated to prescribe them to
people for these off-label purposes just because they
wanted them. In addition, these drugs would more
likely maintain or increase than reduce social inequal-
ity. Equal access to these drugs would not ensure
equal beneficial outcomes.
A significant body of data on the long-term effects
of psychopharmacology to enhance normal levels of
cognition or mood is not yet available. So there is no
decisive reason for a policy that would prohibit the
use of drugs for this purpose. Nevertheless, the
potential harm from chronic use of enhancing drugs
could be significant, which would seem to justify
erring on the side of safety and adopting a precau-
tionary principle limiting their use. At the same time,
as an expression of autonomy competent individuals
should be permitted to take enhancing drugs and to
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take responsibility for their effects. In adopting a
reasonable middle ground between these two posi-
tions, we should issue the warning: “User Beware.”
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